we cannot withdraw from this relentless fight against terrorism and the best assurai ce for that is the continuation of PJ esident's rule until the situation retur is to a point where we can restore popular Government. It is wrong and i is pathetic to believe that there is an upsurge for popular Governmi nt headed by any one from the Shieomani Akali Dal party. In fact, what is popular about them? The e is nothing which is popular about t lem. In fact, it is doubtful if they command a majority in the State Legislature if we exclude the disqualified Members. The only way th; t Government survived between December, 1985 and May, 1987 was b cause of the Congress party wh.ch supported that Government, and once we withdrew our support, once we took a political decision that we vill be failing the people of this coi ntry if we support a Government wl ich was collapsing, disintegrating, dis wiving because of its own inconsist •ncies, the decision to impose Presid mt's Rule was inevitable. Sir *i* must humbly seek the support *al* thi j House to this Bill to confer legisla ive powers upon the President (Airing President's Rule.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. HANUMANTHAPPA): Now the question is:

"That the Bi l to confer on the President the] ower of the Legislature of the State of Punjab to make laws, be taken into consideration."

The motion was adopted.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. HANUMANTHAPPA): We shall now take up clause-by-clause consideration of the Bill.

Clauses 2 and I *were added to the Bill.*

Clause 1, *the Enacting Formula and the Title we e added to the Bill.*

SHRI P. CHIDAMBARAM; Sir, I move;

"That the Bill be passed."

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. HANUMANTHAPPA): The question is;

"That the Bill be passed." *The motion was adopted.*

SHORT DURATION DISCUSSIONS RE: INDO SRI LANKAN AGREEMENT

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. HANUMANTHAPPA): The House will take up Short Duration Discussion on the statement made by *the* Prime Minister in the House °n the 31st July, 1987, regarding the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka.

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY (Tamil Nadu): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, I am very happy that our hon. Prime Minister (returned safely unhurt, when the Sri Lankan sailor attacked him during the guard of honour. But, Sir, what was the immediate reaction of the head of the Sri Lankan Government, Mr. Jayewardene that appeared in the press? He said, due to sun stroke, the sailor fainted and fell on the Prime Minister. Thai was the reaction. That shows the inner mind of Mr. Jayewardene. Our Hon'ble Prime Minister described this Accord as unprecedented in the 20th century. Yes, I concur with him. It is an unprecedented Accord because this is an Accord between the mediator and the aggressor. It is not an Accord between the aggressor and the aggressed. It is not an Accord between the oppressor and the oppressed. It is not an Accord between the mediator and the aggressor. I am shocked to know that the militants were not taken into confidence and they did not give their consent to the Accord. So,

[Shri V. Gopalsamy]

they were not a party to the Accord. LITE, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eexam, they are a force to reckon with in Sri Lanka and their leader, Mr. Prabhakaran was brought here and he was kept in Ashoka Hotel at the time the Sri Lankan Radio broadcast that he was kept under protective custody of Indian Government. I myself went there on 29th July to the Ashoka Hotel. He was staying in Room No. 518 in the 5th floor. The black cat commondos were there. I was not permitted even after I established my identity as a Member of Parliament. So, he was kept incommunicado. For what reasons, they did not give the consent? According to my information, he was brought here tricked and trapped. That is why he gave a statement immediately when he was told about the package proposals that they have walked into a trap and they have been stabbed behind our back. I would tike to know from the hon. Minister for what reasons the militants were not taken into confidence because they have not given their consent. Even on 4th August, Mr. Prabakaran made it categorically clear that "it has been imposed on us. We were not taken into confidence. We have not given our consent. This package of proposals will not bring peace and freedom for our people." Sir, the most untrustworthy, unreliable, un-dependable politician of whole South-East Asia, according to my opinion, is Mr. Jayewardene, the President of Srj Lanka. It is he who led the agitation against the Pact of 1957. The man who has been the supreme advocate for Sinhalese chauvinism, the man who has been a force all along to nurture racial hatred in the minds of the Sinhalese people all these years, for three decades, the man who ruthlessly waged a war against his own population, the Tamils, the man who vowed to finish all the Tamils, the Tamil militants, all of a sudden, has become the Messiah of Peace. It took many years to get wisdom even for Gau-tama Buddha. But the head of a monstrous regime, one fine morning, suddenly gets wisdom and declares dialogue and accord. For what reason? He declared that military solution is the only possible way to deal with the problem. He launched his three forces, the Army, Navy and Air Force, to crush the militants. Even though he launched all the three forces, he failed. Then he wanted to disarm the militants. Therefore, he opted for this Accord.

Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, the most disturbing and shocking aspect of the Accord is sub-clause (3) of clause (2) regarding referendum. In Thimpu, when the Tamils, including the militants, presented their proposals, out of the four cardinal subjects they put forth, only one thing you have conceded, that is .regarding their traditional homeland that is, the Eastern Province should be linked with the Northern Province and should be treated as one administrative unit. Clause 2.3 of the Accord says that there will be a referendum on or before 31st December, 1988 to enable the people of the eastern province to decide whether the eastern province should remain linked with the northern province as one administrative unit. On the very next day, when Pressmen sought a clarification from Mr. Jayewardene, he clearly stated that there was no question of linking up and these two provinces only will be working together. Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, the clause referring to a referendum in the Accord is a fraud against Tamils; a deliberate fraud against the interests of Tamils committed by Sri Lanka to which India has become a party, because, Mr. Jayewardene himself says,—I quote from "The Hindu" dated 7th August and this is a report from the Reuter agency—"Mr. Jayewardene said the peace accord envisaged a temporary linking, into a single administrative unit, of the Tamil-dominated North

with the Eastern, province, where Tamils are outnumbered by Sinhalese and Muslim;. But a referendum to be held ja the East after one year would sun Ly reject the continuation of the arrangement. "So what are we quarrelling about," he asked Sinhalese opponents of the accord. He s; d "no fear needed .about the result 0f the referendum" and urged those who opposed the link-up of the t vo provinces to join him in campaigning in the East against it." He says he is going to campaign against this merger to get suport for ;he referendum. He has spelt out hi inner mind. He is not for the mei [ex. Sir, the demography of the E istern province has been totally changed due to State-aided colonisatic 1 over thirty years. In 1957, the population of Sinhalese in the Eastern Province was only nine per cent. Today it is twenty-four per cent due to State-aided colonisation, du- to forcible colonisation. And th« population of Tamils has heen reduce d by 20 per cent. As the British played the divide-and-rule game in I) dia, the ˙same Policy is being practised by Mr. Jayewar-dene to divide he Hindus and the Muslims. That is why he says the Muslims will rot vote for merger. Muslims, thoug \ they are Muslims, first they are Tamils. Both the Hindus and the Muslims have joined the militants. Yet he says *ne Muslims will lot vote for merger. This is a divide and-rule policy. Also, thousands and ihousands of Sinhalese have been brought into the areas which Tamils have evacuated due to Sri Lankan terrorist attacks. So he himself clearly said that the referendum will go against merger. Tamils have been cheated. They have been betrayed through this clause regarding referendum. That is why I said it is a fraud against the Tamils. The agreement also says, "A simple majority will be sufficient t0 determine the result of the referendum." Had the Government of India been sincere t0 pre iect the interests of Tamils, they vould have suggested one thing: At least let us make 1957 the cut-off year; that is, 'those who entered this area after 1957 will not be given the franchise, the right to vote. But they have not done it. Therefore, the referendum is definitely going to decide against merger. Mr. Jayawardene has put one other condition. The proposals are conditional to an acceptance of the proposals negotiated from 4th May, 1986 to 19th December, 1986 and residual matters not finalised during the above negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of time. What are the proposals discussed between May and December, 1986? These proposals were not at all accepted by the Tamils, including the moderate Tamils, because during the December, 19th proposals you all suggested the inclusion of Amparai electorate in the inquiry. You wanted to divide the eastern province into three provinces. That was not accepted by the' Tamils. This Amparai electorate has taken shape due to colonisation where Sinhalese have been brought. What about the devolution of powers? Even Annexure C which was formulated through Madam Gandhi's time was better than this proposal. What about the devolution of powers? What about job opportunities? What about opportunities in the educational institutions? It is very vital but it is very much vague here. The Tamils have been deprived of their basic rights all these years and that is why they have been fighting. It is very vague about the devolution of powers. Not only that. Here another most disturbing aspect of the Accord is sub-clause (6) to Clause 16, part (d) which says:

> "The Government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are residing there concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan ' refugees from Tamil Nadu."

[Shri V. Gopalsamy]

These Tamils were taken there in the early period of the 19th century as plantation labour by the British Estate Owners. Thousands and thousands of Tamils went there from the southern districts of Tamil Nadu. They shed their blood and sweat and tears and it is due to their sweat and toil that Sri Lanka attained prosperity. But in 1948 due to the most obnoxious legislation they were made Stateless and voteless. India committed an unpardonable blunder, an unpardonable betrayal, against the Tamils in 1964 in the name of the Shastri-Srimovo Pact. These Tamils have lived there; they have worked there, for more than 100 years or more than 150 years. What right iave you got to bring them here? It is the duty of the Sri Lankan Government to confer citizenship on them. Leave alone that. In the year 1981, Madam Gandhi had emphatically stated, "No more repatriation. The agreement is over. It is the duty of the Sri Lankan Government to give citizenship to those Tamils, the plantation labour.". But now you are going to take them. Lakhs and lakhs have landed here under Shastri-Srimovo pact and life has become a hell for them. Now you say you are going to take two lakhs. For what purpose? What right have you got? "They have been therefore more than a hundred years and it is the duty of the Government of Sri Lanka. You should have stressed this point in the talks with the Sri Lankan Government and you should have said; "Give citizenship to these people.". But you are equating the refugees who came here due to the gehocidal attacks there with these people; you are equating them. Now, what is the reaction of the refugees? They ask; "We have lost our property; we have lost our mothers; we have lost our kith and kin; and we have lost our children. Now, should we go there as beggars?". This is the reaction of the people in the refugee camp. Now, with regard to this clause, for bringing those repatriates I here, you have no right. Why are you bringing them here? Therefore, this aspect was not at all considered. You did not get the consent of the Tamils.

I Sir, our honourable Prime Minister, since the accord was signed, from that minute onwards, wherever he goes talks about the accord. Now, this is his speech in Naini on 1st August:

> The accord provides that Sri Lanka would not allow the presence on its soil of armed forces of any country or allow warships of any kind to enter its waters."

Sir, he is misleading the country. You show me where the provisions are in the accord. Nothing is there. About the presence of intelligence agencies, there is nothing. Only in the exchange of letters it is mentioned. There also it is very hypothetical and it is very vague.

> "The two leaders will reach an early understanding about the need for the employment of foreign military intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presence will not prejudice the Indo-Sri Lankan relations."

Why have you not put it in the agreement? Also, about Trincomalee :

> "Trincomalee or any other place in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use to any country."

Why have you not put it in the agreement? ... *(Time bell rings)* ... •Kindly give me some more time^ Sir.

Sir, our honourable Prime Minister said in Naini that no foreign army would be allowed on the soil of Sri Lanka or no foreign vessels would be allowed in the waters of Sri Lanka. But the very next day, Sir,

Mr. Jayewardene has made the request to the USA, UK, China and Pakistan for mhtary assistance. He himself has state.[this and it has come in the Pres-;. The$_n$ why are you misleading the country? He has categorically said; "I have sought help, military assistance, from the USA, UK, Pakistan and China." I would like to know from our honable Minister of State for Exter nal Affairs whethe$_{,}$ any member of the foreign intelligence agency has so far vacated, ha: gon$_e$ away from Sri Lanka. No as left. What. about the Special Merest Section of. Israel? They aj$_3$ still ther$_e$ and Mosad is[1] still t[1]

Sir, our honourable Prim$_e$ Minister, whe$_n$ h$_e$ addressee! the people on the Marina sands on 2nd August, said one thing. I an very sorry about his observations and thig type of observation was circulated in the form of a literati re by a Sinhalese racist some time]last year to the Members of Parliament and it was that the Sinhali s$_e$ originally went from Bengal an{ Orissa and the Tamils went from Tamil Nadu. He wanted to create a rift or a sort of clash between t[1] $_e$ Aryan race and the Dravidian ra< e. That literature was circulated an sngst the Members of Parliament. Our Prime Minister also goes there ar i makes this statement at Madras that the Sinhalese went from Oris ia and Bengal and the Tamils went from Tamil Nadu. Sir, I am very sorry. There 4.00 p.mare two lasses of Tamils in Sri Lank;:. I have just now referred to the plantation labour who went there from here in the 19th century. The other Tamils who are fighting there and who have been facing the massacre all these years in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka ar$_e$ th original inhabitants from the dawn of history. Sir, M'adam Gandhi, the the i Prime Minister, while discussing ihe Sri Lanka affairs on the floor of this very House in the year 1984 Augusl —I think it was her last speech made on the floor of the House—said in clear-cut terms [that] the Tamils are th$_e$ original inhabitants of Sri Lanka. It is a statement of Madam Gandhi. But ou$_r$ Prime Minister went all the "way to Tamil Nadu to exhibit his ignorance of history. It is not $_a$ small thing but it hurts us.

Everybody" was expecting that the legislation will be tabled in the Parliament of Sri Lank$_a$ tomorrow, i.e. Tuesday for ratification. But Mr. Jayewardehe has now announced that it may be in the latter part of September or October. He has also stated to the press ana the people that once the militants are disarmed, the Indian "Army ha$_s$ to go back. Sir, when our Indian Army visited the area, the Sri Lankan Tamils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces were very happy because all these years they have suffered the genocidal attack, violence and repression. Their destiny has been written in fears and blood. The million dollars question is that the moment you withdraw your troops, whether the same old story will be repeated o$_r$ not. The 200 Army Camps have not so far been removed in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. He hag announced that he is going to absorb in the para-mili[+]ary forces and Home Guards those hooligans and thugs who were recruited to annihilate the Tamils. All right. What about the Tamils? What is their representation in the security forces, in the Police sn$_r$] the Army? That is why I said about the devolution of power everything is vague in the Agreement.

Sir, even yesterday a Revered Father stated that at least for 25 years the Indian Army should be here. Sir, all the commitment that you have made to the Sri Lankan Government is for their benefit. The militants themselves have said thi$_s$ that the Agreement arrived at between the Indian and Sri Lankan Governments is for their own benefit and not for their benefit. What will happen after Tamil Militants surrendering the arms? The purpose was t$_0$ disarm the militants. But why did they take *up*

the arms? It was to protect the dignity and honour of their mothers and sisters. They were compelled to take up arms to protect the dignity of their mothers and sisters and 'not simply for the purpose of taking up arms. You cannot equate any other situation with that of Sri Lanka. They are not terrorists. They are freedom fighters. What happens after they lay down their arms? What happen® if President Jayewardene asks the Indian Army to withdraw? Where is the guarantee in the Agreement about the security of Tamils? There is no guarantee. I want a categorical answer from the Government as to what they are going to do in such a situation. What is the .guarantee for the security of Taanilians?

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. HANUTMANTHAPPA): Please conelude.

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: I am concluding, Sir.

Sir, if you ask me to give my opinion about the Accord, instead of making a speech, I could simply show this cartoon by Mr Laxman which aopeared last week in the Times of India'. Sir, here is Mr. Jayewardene. He is wonderfully portrayed. And he welcomes Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. He says, "It is bound to work, Rajiv with an expert like you." Here is our expert, our hon. Prime Minister, the master of accords, who has a penchant for accords, who surprised the country with Assam Accord an^ the Punjab Accord. But, Sir, the cartoon depicts him like this: He walks with a bandaged leg and a bandaged hand. On the bandaged hand, it is written 'Assam Accord' and on the bandaged leg, it is written 'Punjab Accord'. So, what is going to happen? This is going to be worse than the Punjab Accord in its implementation. Therefore, Sir, I will add only one point. In the name of Accord, you have betrayed the interests of the Tamils; just to divert the attention of the people in India, you have brought this Accord.

SHRI A- G. KULKARNI (Maharashtra); Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, I heard with rapt attention my ycung friend, Mr. Gopalsamy, giving out his thrust on the Sri Lankan. Accord and how it is going to be detrimental to this country. Mr. Gopalsamy, young as he is, mentioned about the cartoons. If politicians are to go by cartoons^ then what he spoke was quite right because cartoons are for what you just call enjoyment of the political scene. It does not mean that it is Geeta for you. You are a politician..

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: I do not believe in Geeta.

SHRI A. G. KULKARNI: He is young, a little bit impulsive. I can accept that.

Sir, now I go to the main problem, how this Accord has been really beneficial and how the Parliament, the politicians, responsible persons in the country have to give this Accord the time to succeed. There are many reasons why this Accord had been gone into by the Government- Sir, I have read many Government notifications and Government statements. My young friend from Tamil Nadu and also other political party representatives are aware that this etnnic problem is going on for a very long time. Sinre 1983 violence has taken piece and persons who have got nothing to do with the political aspect of this ethnic problem have been killed. Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, I do feel that this problem has to be solved not only because the Tamils are concerned—my young friend and those who are opposing the Accord should take this into consideration—but also there is the security environment of our country which has to be taken into consideration. I do not want to speak in detail what the security perceptions are, particularly the security hazards which this-

country is facing. A present, Sir, this country is in a v«y difficult position as regards the security aspect from its neighbours, (rom all sides of the continent. Every ody is awares of the nefarious intento ns of tha Pains tan Government, everybody is aware of the danger from C lina. Everybody is aware of various small States which are bordering his country and it has now come to *i* stage that the present political situa ion in this country and the security spect should not be lost sight of by n y friends in the opposition political ^ arties because I do give great importance to the secu rity perception of th s country and it is not only to the ci edit of the Gov ernment, but it is aiso a courageous act on the part of t"e Prime Minister, who has signed this accord, who has forged this accon after long negotiations over the last one year. I feel that the Prime Minister deserves the credit for his courag *i* shown.

Mr. Gopalsamy described the Prime Minister's hand and eg in a bandage, etc. etc. and that curtoon about the Punjab accord and tie Assam accord. We have discussed trie Punjab accord just now. Who has -ailed in Punjab? Is it the Congress Party who failed in Punjab? *(Interrupt!, ns).* It is all the political parties vhich have failed in Punjab. It is n t the Congress Party alone. It is *the* failure of the Janata Party, the Bharatiya Janata Party in fact all th, political parties, including the Akali Party. Tn fact it is more the Akali -larty which has failed. I can say th*t when Mr. Barbara Singh spoke he re...

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह (बिहार) : महोदय, व्यवस्था का प्रश्न है ।

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री हेच० हनुमनतप्पा) : इसमें व्यवस्था क्या है ?

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : है, और यह है कि बहस चल रही है लंका के बारे में और यह उसे पंजाब के बारे में ले आए हैं, यह पंजाब पर बोल रहे हैं ।

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री हेच० हनुमनतप्पा) : राम अवधेश जी, आप भूल गए जब पंजाब पर डिसकशन हो रहा था, आप सीलोन पर ले आए थे । आप भी भूल गए थे, जो पंजाब के डिसकशन में सीलोन को ले आए थे ।

SHRI A. G. KULKARANI: Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir when Punjab problem was discussed here and a reference about the particular provision in the Constitution was made, I was sitting there in the Opposition. Even then, Sir, I supported the Congress Party and desired that a security belt around Punjab should be provided, because the Punjab problem cannot be solved by the Akali party and that is what it has come to. I do hope that even the Communist parties which are there are going to the people and I do feel that other Political parties will do the same thing, go to the people and convince the people that these terrorist are a danger to the country and to the integrity of the country.

But, Sir, the Punjab accord is 'not my subject. Even in Assam and everywhere the Prime Minister, who has done the greatest courageous act in Sri Lanka, should really be congratulated by the political parties, who should appreciate the courage shown by the Prime Minister. Sir, I need not mention but unfortuna*ely he has had to face the butt of a gun and God was great and he was saved. I do feel, Sir, instead of casting jokes on these matters, a little bit of seriousness should be brought in this liscus-sion.

Sir, I was on the point of security perception. I cannot explain or soeak more on what is called the security perspective because it is the Government which has really to express its view. But I do feel that looking to the security perspective what I find now is that India is being isola*ed and it is in the interest of this country and the Tamilians who are in Sri Lanka that the steps taken by the

[Shri A. G. Kulkarni]

Government are supported by all political parties.

Sir, the other points which my friend has made politically regarding the referendum and small matters, etc. one has to take a larger view, I should say. We have to take a larger view. If we really want to defuse the conflict in Sri Lanka, it is necessary to have a larger view as well a3 a magnanimous heart and we must ignore these small problems. Many attempts are heing made by certan political parties and personalities to confuse this issue. There might have been small matters which should haye been sorted out better or there might be some other aspects of the accord; but by and large if we take a larger view of it, I feel that this accord is not only in the interest of this country but it is in the interest of those Tamij organisations which were fighting so heroically there.

Again, some defects have been pointed out that LTTE have not surrendered arms. But it is a slow process. When two warring entities are brought together, it takes a little time and I don't think delay 0f one day here or delay of a week there is going ■to break this accord...

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : भारत को क्या लाभ हो रहा है ?

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री ऐच० हनुमनतप्पा) : अवधेश जी, आप बोलने वाले हैं । बैठिए ।

श्री अरविन्द गणेश कुलकर्णी : भारत को क्या लाभ हो रहा है ? अरे भाई भारत को ही पूरा लाभ हो रहा है ।

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. HANUMANTHAPPA): Don't answer. You continue.

SHRI A. G KULKARNI: I am not answering him. After all, he is a young friend of mine and I know his entire approach to many problems.

Out country as well as other elements in Sri Lanka, the Tamils, are going to be benefited. India is going to be benefited. And if India is going to be benefited in its security perceptions, how can he say that India is not going to be benefited? I do feel that these guarantees were needed to show to the Sri Lanka Government and to Tamils there that they are in safe, hands and that they should agree to what the Government has decided in their own interest, for which much effort was made. The Chief Minister . of Tamil Nadu had put in his efforts, and it was due to the joint efforts of all concerned that this problem could be solved.

I have also got some doubts. I want to know whether in these perceptions, the Sri Lankan Government has agreed that other forces, like the Israeli force, the U.S. force, etc. are to be slowly disbanded and it "will be an issue only between the Indian Government and the Sri Lankan Government which has been solved by this agreement in order to help the Tamils and to put an end to the violence, so that this agreement can work peacefully.

I do think the perception of the Government is not worng. The Government has really done an excellent job to defuse the situation in the interest of security, and I am sure this accord will produce the desired results, and for this, credit goes to the courageous act of our Prime Minister.

SHRI K. MOHANAN (Kerala): Mr. Vice-Chairman, at the outset I would like to make it clear that I and my party are generally in support of *» the accord signed by the two Heads of States of India and Sri Lanka en 29th of last month. It was our consistent stand for all those years that a political solution could be found out to end the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka. I am fully aware that there are many doubts, fears, apprehensions on both sides, the Sinhala majority and the Tamii minority in regard to the pro-

visions of th accoi i. Not only that. I am also aware tha the signing of the accord by itself will not solve the ethnic proUem. In spite of all these its ar j buts, I am in favour of the acc< rd because H is a step in the right c irection to end the ethnic probem in :3ri Lanka and restore peace, amity md progress in the island nation. Sir, the most important part of thi$_s$ accord, according to me, is that it provides for the preservation of the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Linka. It also re-cognises the island s status as a multiethnic and multi-li igua one. The three main languages, namely, Sinhala, Tamil and English have been recognised as the officiEL languages of the country. The ace >rd also recognises that the Sri Lankin Tamil people, the minority ethnic g oup, will have the right to liv$_e$ with .thers with an equal status. According to me, thi$_s$ is the essence of this ac :ord and all other details are of onh secondary importance. If these pr nciples are adhered to by the Sri Lanl an Government, the Sinhala majority E ; well as the Tamil minority, it will be an achievement not only for Sri Lanka but also to the entire region.

Sir, I am fully ware that there are many hurdles in t ie way of the imple mentation of the accord. An influen tial .section of pi blic opinion in Sri Lanka is still opi osmg it. Every day, we get dstur ing as well as encouraging 1 ews from Sri Lanka My e iteemed colleague, Sri Gopalsam *r,* pointed out here the news emanating from Sri Lanka in regard t > the sending back of the Indian peace c^oDing force. There were also Press > sports that Mr J ye-wardene is tryim to seek the support of the U.S..A., the U K and some other countries. This is all disturbing news. In spite of all tl ese things, w$_e$ have to take into aci ount the situation prevailing in th$_e$ Sub-continent and tie will have I i view the situation from the angl I of our national security also.

Sir. I wecome the decision of the LTTE, which is the main Tamil mM-

tant group i$_n$ Sri Lanka, to accept this accord, even though with reservations. I know, even in this latest statement, Mr Prabakaran has expressed some reservations. It s quite natural. At the same time, welcome their decision to accept the accord and to la$_v$ down arrms. Of course this laying down of arms also is a difficult process. I do agree. But I expect that this proees$_s$ will go through smoothly,, on the basis of mutual understanding and negotiations. S r, it is a very complicated issue. Within a fortnight or a month we can not solv$_e$ this. We will have to move step by step in the right direction. That is why I am asking my friends to be a little patient. Le[1] us wait and See and if this accord is implemented n its letter and spirit, it will b$_e$ helpful to Sri Lankan Tamil minority as well as our country.

I do not want to go into details of this accord at this stage. It i$_s$ a fact that st'i some doubts and fears are prevailing in the minds of the Tamil ethnic minority in Sri Lanka. Now oui re ponsibUity has increased. Now we are not a mere mediator now we are a r>^-ty to the agreement. So our responsibility ha$_s$ increased. It is the duty of the Sri Lankan Government as wel as the Government of India to remov these doubts from the minds of the ^amil minority and to give full protection to them at any cost.

It appears from press report that there h?$_s$ been a significant change in the att tude of some important political persons like Prime Minister Prema-madasa nd Interna} Se unty Minister, Mr. Attmiathmudali, from their original stand. If th$_e$ oress reports are correct, this is something encouraging. We Inve to utilise all these important persons to implement this accord in its letter and spirit. Even though the fundamentalist and vested interests among the Sinhala majority are opposing the accord, there i$_s$ another en-couraging factor—that the left and democratic forces among the Sinhala majority as well as Tamii minority are supporting this accord and they are

[Shri K. Mohanati]

for the impementation of this accord. Thi$_s$ is also an encouraging factor. Con tinued confrontation will yield nothing The latest reports show that more than 14 thousand people were killed and the whole economy of th$_e$ island has been shattered. For us also, as I have already mentioned, it has been **a** matter of concern from the viewpoint of our national security. We should realise that the only gainers of this continued confrontation are the US imperialsts and their agents, those who are working in this region. The region is already a zone of tension. Not only that, in the background of the Gulf War, tension is mounting in the Indian Ocean. The latest reports indicate that the United State$_s$ is deploying more and more naval power in the Indian Ocean. This is also a cause for concern. So we do not want to make this region **a** zone of tension; we have to make a zone of peace. This is more important than anything else. So, if this accord and its implementation help us go a step forward, it will be to the benefit of th$_e$ people of Sri Lanka as well as the people of India and generally the Indian subcontinent.

With these words, I concude, Sir.

SHRI S. C- JAMIR (Nagaland); Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, as Member of the Council of Elders, I would like to offer some of my observations in a very very dispassionate manner. Our view[9] our observations have to cut across Party line because it concerns the whole nation.

The Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement of 29th July, 1987, marks a new chapter a new leaf in the relationship between these two neighbouring countries. And more so, it ha$_s$ put an end to the ethnic conflict which was threatening not only the very survival of the ethnic minority Tamils of Sri Lanka but it also thea-tened the Non-Alignment Movement which we have vey assiduously built up over the years. **It** was in **a** situation of stalemate that the Governmen of Jndi$_a$ had to step in at the invitation of the Government of Sri Lanka. This Accord is classic in the sense that India, though not a contending party—not a party to the conflict— had to enter into an agreement with a party in the conflict. It is not in any way a gunboat diplomacy. But the very fact that India had to sign this Accord as a third party, clearly proves that we enjoy moral authority over the situation. Had Sri Lanka no faith in us, if not the militants had faith in us we could not have entered into this agreement with Sri Lanka. So, I should say that from the very beginning India stood for one principle— that the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka shall have to be maintained but, at the same time, their ethnic problem has to be solved through a political framework. .... (Interruptions) ..

Sir, it is oniy the wearer who knows where the shoe pinches. I am also from an area Whose people had undergone that kind of a situation which th$_e$ minority Tamils in Sri Lanka had undergone. When the very survival of a minority group i$_s$ threatened, when they feel that their identity would be submerged one way or the other, When they are pushed to the wall, then and then only people take up arms. In Sri Lanka, over the years against this ethnic minority of Tamils, in spite of their definite territory, in spite of their population, in spite of their idenity and culure, systematic calculated, steps were taken to suppress them through various methods. I think th$_e$ Sri Lankan Tamils nlso are peace-loving people, but they are human beings who want to survive $_a$s a people. They were compelled to take up arms. Why? Because they wanted to defend themselves, because they wanted to defend their own homeland. They very words 'Tamil Eelam" and "Separate Home land" had inspired a generation of Tamils there to live through blood and sacrifices. This problem would have been solved long ago had the Sinhalese Govt, recognised the very identity of the Tamil in Sri Lanka. But it is only when they replied

through arms, hrough -violence— and then oniy —good sense prevailed in the mind of the President of Sri Lanka.

Mr. Vice-Chairm m, Sir. when we, as a nation, we, as a country deeply feel the very ethnic identity of the Sri Lankan people I thin) we have to apply the same yardstick in this country also. When a minority group, whether it is tribal or any otiier minority, wants to survive by aaving autonomy, don't brand them as anti-national. They want to sui/ive, they want to live, they want I) exist as citizens. When its pride i hurt, then, however small a community it might be, it will rise. It w 11 not be afraid of laying down live< for its causa. Therefore, the Sr: Lanka agreement has taught us i good lesson that solutions should lot be by sheer armies but thr< ugh recognition of their identity, whether it ifi ethnic or communal or tribal, which should be the guiding pr nciple in the solution of many of the problems even in this country. f we do so in the case of our prob ems, I think, we shall be in a bette • position to appre. ■data ou_r problems and solve them in a manner thai our people will want.

The accord is a victory of the old tradition of toler nee and spiritual values of the tvo countries. The Prime Minister, 3b ri Rajiv Gandhi who symbolises the ethical and moral spirit of India persuaded the Sri Lankan President Shri Jayewardene wh_0 is a representative of the Buddhist wisdom, and he has responded positively. This ; ccord was acclaimed by diverse for es, including countries not friendly to India. It is an evidence of its si xiificance for peace not only in this region but for peace in the whole world.

This is also a mique accord in many ways. On formal request we have to deploy Inojan armed forces in Sri Lanka. For wl it? I think here my dear colleague wl- > preceded me also said that we have to deploy our forces to establish peace among their own people and also to help surrender of arm_s by the Tamil militants and to guarantee security.

I want t_0 make some observation here, Sir. In an insurgency, in a revolution of this type, those people who were fighting for a cause, had their own status, they had their own ranks, they had their own authority, they had their own writ over a certain, area. Once you disarm them, when you strip them of the arms, then, psychologically they will definitely feel that they are like fish out of water. And that feeling if you allow to linger on, them "frustration would creep in. The feeling of de-fencelessness, helplessness, if you allow to continue, I think, then, vou will not be able to enthuse in them the confidence which is intended in this accord.

It is my request, therefore, that, in order to create confidence in the minds of the Tamils and for the security of their life and property, I think, arrangement should be made in such a way that those militants who have been fighting for their homeland should be recruited either in police or para-military forces. I am sure that they will not have confidence in the local police because bitterness has bsen built up over the years. Unless that confidence is created, the police force of Sri Lanka will not be of any usa in maintaining law and order in the region. I would, therefore, request the Government of India to prevail upon the Sri Lanka Government to ensure that those militants who have fought, should not be allowed to get frustrated because once they are frustrated, they can again revert back to the old habit of fighting, and that will be a very dangerous problem once again.

Sir, India should us_e her good offices to ensure that the Tamils get proper facilities in matters of appointment, recruitment and admission in the universities. I was told that there had been a lot of discrimination

[Shri S. C. Jamir]

against the Tamils in matters of appointment and even in admission in the universities. If the Sri Lanka Gov. ernment could give treatment, equal treatment to all, that alone can win the confidence of the Tamils, which has been shaken, I think, as a result of the conflict over the years. Here some argue that the Accord was in opposition. If that is so, I think, he or she is either too naive or does not understand the spirit of independence which permeates a free sovereign, nation. Sri Lanka though a small island it is a proud nation, its strength of character is manifested in the Accord where they have readily agreed to accommodate the aspirations of the Tamils of Sri Lanka in £i political framework but also ensuring the unit and integrity of that country. Formation of a Council whore thers will be a Chief Minister and a Governor, I think, they should be equipped with full powers to look after the internal affairs of that region. If we look into the history of the Island, Sir, we find that the ethnic conflict has resulted in untold sufferings and hardship to the innocent civilians. I wish General Aurora was here. In a conflict like this while trying to catch one insur. gent, we harass 99 people. To catch one, you have to harass 99 and these 99 become your enemies and this exercise has continued for the last fou.r years and I can quite understand the psychology, the feelings, the sentiments and the emotions of those Tamils who are in that Jaffna area specially. Therefore, it not only enjoins upon the Srj Lanka Government but on us also to use our good offices t0 ins+il confidence in the minds of the Sri Lanka people.

Sir, this Accord will be a golden chapter in the achievements of Shri Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India. He has achieved a feat which eluded our leaders in India as well as fn Sri Lanka for years. But I wart to give a caution on this. Any agreement or accord is always a compromise. So naturally we have to give concessions from both sides. So we cannot satisfy fully cent per cent any party because it is a mutual agreemant and, therefore, there sha.l definitely be concessions from both sides. The only redeeming feature is that both sides have agreed to abide by the agreement. But we have yet to see whether the signatories to the agreement will implement this Accord both in letter and spirit. *(Time bell rings)* I will conclude shortly.

Sir, immediately after signing of the Accord, thei-2 have been riots in Sri Lanka. Not only that the recklessness and madness of a sailor who attacked the honoured guest at most solemn occasion, deepens India's suspicion. But today we are happy to see through press reports that some political leaders in Sri Lanka have begun to realise the reality of the Accord because it benefits them and benefits us also. This Accord will benefit us because if ths situation worsens in Sri Lanka, its repurcus-sions will be intensely felt in this country. If there is peace, it will be felt immediately in the Deccan Pla. teau. Our friends in Tamil Nadu will definitely feel that very strongly. But as a result of signing of this Accord, we have been able to remove a suspicion and the danger of embroiling in the whole country and Sri Lanka.

Sir, I want to caution one thing. All of us prefer peace to war, justice to oppression, harmony to discord, order to chaos and I think our attempt in this Accord is to fulfil this objective. All plans though launched with great hopes have to some degree disappointed planners for they have floundered on the rock of human selfishness. Let us ensure that w« don't flounder on the human selfishness as far as this Accord is concerned. Blessed arc the peace makers for they will be called sons of God. They will earn IOVP and goodwill of their people. Likewise, our Prime Minister and Jayewardene

have earned the joodwill of every, body not only in India but in the whols world. Wit i these few words, I once again thank you.

SHRI VALAMP JRI JOHN (Tamil Nadu): Mr. Vici -Chairman, as a party, we welcorr e this Accord. It is true that this Accord is a historic Accord and it is classic agreement and I would cert liniy say, it is a great historic Ace >rd anoiter) in tiie milk of human kindness. At an hour of paril wh> n hundreds and thousands of Tarn Is were massacred, it is a bold initiat ve from the Prime Minister of India in consultation with my leader D . M. G. R- Some solution has been ound out. A child is born and I do not want to ba a prophet of doom Mr. Gopalsamy while initiating t le discussion, was airing certain J 'scrvations, certain doubts and it is /itbin his right to ■express his own nisgivings on this kind of an Accon and all his fears are not unfounded. There is some kind of a foundation or any fear that comes out of a battler like him. But what I find is tha as I was hearing Mr. Jamir, as he was concluding, he was peeling out *t: m*\ the Holy Bible a few statements from the Sermon on the Mount. K jg a]l very pleading to ears but as I was hearing him his pleasing staten ents, flowery tu of phrases of Jesns Christ, I was only reminded thi i after the Accord, as a nation, we a e more in a celebrating mood thai i in a deliberating attitude. Pacts r ay come. There may be historic occasions. They may remain as great institutional changes in the passage of nistory. When the Versailles Pact '*cs* ne, half of the globe went in ipprobation of the Versailles Pact b t history tells us the same Versailles Pact was com. pletely submerged in encomiums and phrases in flowery terms caused another war. But S r, tha history t: lis us very clearly, i amplifies""^ very clear terms that -he Versailles Pact as an accord, as an initiative ever remains fo, a new<>r world. But one shall see the imp cations, the after-math of this kin(of a Versailles Pact because this divided the world into two warring principalities in its horizontal divisions, it might have caused another war. See, anything may happen in the aftermath of a pact or an Accord. But as an Accord, as an agreement, one should accept that it is a very bold initiative on the part of the Prime Minister that he wants peace, peace at any price. He has taken this initiative because as a messenger, as a harbinger of peace, he has taken this bold initia. five for peace in the nearby area, in tha Indian Ocean because this kind of peace initiative could have" stopped this massacr, for the time being We welcome this Accord and the seal of approval has already been put by major sections in Sri Lanka itself. But what I find is many journalists have gone there, writers have gone, our friends have returned after seeing these people, after really experiencing their pulse, tell us thst major sections of Tamils in the northern as well as eastern provinces are happy. But they are no t jubilant. Still the element of insecurity is there in their minds. When the Indian Army was marching in, they welcomed them, they distributed sweets. It all goes to prove that they have been spending sleepless nights and their nij its ere so long shadowy nights. There was infernal massacre. There was a total conflag. ration and when the dawn came, after fearful nights with night ma experiences they have a kind of relief that they have been led to some kind of respite, coo! shower but should be prolonged. This should be prolonging. This should remain for ever and they have been saying so repeatedly. How long the army is going to be on Sri La soilf Clause 15(c) of the Accord makes a provision for the presence of Indian army. Every day reports are coming. Some one says the Indian army is 10,000 in number. It is being stigmatised or branded as a peace-keeping force. It remains there and remains for keeping peace in |he island only with th, Idea saving the ethnic minority of Tamils.

[Shri Valarmpuri John]

It could remain there only under the supreme command of Mr. Jayewardene. At the same time, there is a conflicting report which says that it is not so and there are clues and ciues from Delhi. But our army is there. There is a kind of tense situation that is prevailing for the last few days there. More army men may be forced to go to Sri Lanka. But the expectation of the militants and the freedom-fighters of the major sections of Tamils is that the army should be there at least for ten years. It is repeatedly said there by very Tamil that the Indian army should be on that soil at leas't for 10 years because they have the in-built, inherent fear in their mind "Because of the past harrowing experiences. Once the Indian army comes out of ithat soil, their life and property will be insecure. So, unless and until this kind of an element of insecurity is erased from the minds of Tamils there, there will be no solution. The Accord is welcome as a very bold peace initiative, as a positive step towards peace, permanent peace in the island. But the problelm is, they have been requesting everyone that it should prevail upon the people in Delhi that Indian army should be there for at least five years, ten years. This is the agreement. But are we going to be there? How long we can be there on a foreign soil? Can we be there against the will of the Sri Lankan President? Once the army is withdrawn, again the in-security comes. Today, what I say may appear a mad man's prattle. But in reality, I "tell you, I caution you, this is going to happen. Once the army is withdrawn, the next minute this will happen. The element of insecurity is already enveloping the population there. Already people are feeling that carnage is on. Again and again, they have been saying that only because there is a limp, ing slowness in laying down arms nothing has happened. Why there is limping slowness in laying there is limping slowness in laying down arms? Only because colonisation of the Eastern Province is on unabated. Even after this Accord, there is colonisation. Yesterday, and day-before-yesterday it was there. In this week, there is colonisation. We are not people who could believe some kind of a report in a news, paper, unfounded report. I am not quoting any such. But there are journalists who have gone there, who could analyse things and understand them in a dispassionate manner. They say that colonisation is there. Unless the element of insecurity has been erased from the minds of Tamils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, it is difficult. In such a situation, the limping slowness starts. It is a vicious circle. Unless and until you take a decision to prevail upon Mr. Jayewardene that this is an Accord only to be respected awl cannot be wished away, the position will not improve. If it Is wished away, that will be the greatest betrayal. For an agreement, there are two parties normally. It should be the fighting forces, the ethnic Tamils and the Sinhalese. But here, we are placed in a piquant situation wherein the mediator, the negotiator, has become a party and the Sri Lanka President is another. Two parties have come. But they are not the contenders. They are not warring principalities. A mediator, a negotiator has come into this kind of agreement. Now, what is our res. ponsibility. Suppose we withdraw the army all of a sudden, at the dictates or the wishes of the Sri Lankan President, normalcy will be disturbed. Things will get worse and then, that will be the greatest betrayal in India's history. The reason is, all along, Mr. Jayewardene wanted the militants to be disarmed. But he could not succeed. What was not possible for Mr. Jayewardene was possible for Indian Government. Indian Government assured this and he had no other option and I will not

say anything mo e. They have surrendered. What was not possible for Mr. Jayewardene was possible Tor India. If it is possible for India, then your responsibili y is all the mort.' Tomorrow the qt estion of their senu. rity will be rais ;d. The element of insecurity is thet'e enveloping the whole of the population in the northern and easte n provinces. India will be held respo isible for their security. And India is responsible because India h s played a role in bringing these m litants to a pact and India alone is esponsible, because they ar*» not th parties. India is a party and India should take the res. ponsibility. Mr. Kulkarni is a wise man, a great m n. He was making certain observations. He very correctly said that we should have a security perception. I have great respect for his a.je. In the course of his speech as he was concluding and as He was miking a dispassionate analysis of the >roblem, he posed * question to the honourable Minister, Mr. Natwar Sin h.

He says, we *i\aye* a security perception in that *i* rea; we have to look at this problem from that angle. He reminded this House in a very senatorial way. He said—"Mr. Minister, Kindly assure us, kindly throw light on this, we wculd like to know whether all these troops, these for. eign agencies, i ave all been withdrawn. Or arc they in the process of withdrawing from the island?" This is what he wanted to know from the Government because that was agitating his mind. I would lik<» to inform this House, still the Pakistani paratroopers and task forces an there, still the American commandos are there, rill the Israeli commandoes are tl ere; they are not withdrawing. Of course, they may say, an accord has been completed or an agreement has been concluded, but it js not possible for them to send out a foreign agency all of a sudden within wentyfour hours. We understand it, aid we appreciate it that it is not possible to do so. But our conclusion is, our finding is, there is not even a step taken, not even a small, elementary, initiative taken, by the Sri Lankan Government, Then what will be the situation? Even yesterday and today in front of St Mary'g Church in Batikola tens and thousands of Tamil mothers-have been weeping 'dieir lungs out and wailing, gnashing their teeth, for their children. They are waiting for the return of their children. The process is already on. Even in the State-controlled newspapers they have said there are over 5000 arms with the tigers of LITE and they are surrendering them. The surrendering process is on. Tamil'youths have been held hostage. Those Tamil mothers have been weeping and wailing. I can understand your inability, your passivity, before this agreement, but after this agreement they are still weeping and wailing for their sons and daughters to return from the Boora camps, from the forests and from the death knots. What will happen to them? Our Prime Minister went there. It is not as if we are Painting a rosy picture. Still the situation is grim. If the Sri Lankan President rushes through his referendum in the north-east, it will be a great betrayal, there will be a great danger. He sWll speaks of a referendum; he speaks of December 31. Everything is watery, the ground i« slippery. I would like *to* emphasise »f h» rushes through this kind of a referendum, it will be against the Interests of the minorities, the ethnic Tamils. The whole world will ask: What happened in the eastern province? Colonisation of Sinhalese is on. It is unabated. It is unchecked even today. The second point is at least 50 per cent of the Tamils who had deserted their homes in the eastern province have not returned till today. So they are a minority there. They are not a minority traditionally, habitually. They are a minority purposely. They are reduced to a minority. They have been reduced to a minority by calculated machinations. That is, one province should not be a party. Eastern and northern provinces should not join together and it should not from an **administrative** unit. This is their aim and towards this aim they have been working even today. Therefore, the colonisation is still on. People

have not returned to their homes. Even in Trincomalec 40 villages have been destroyed. People are not returning to their homes because there is the element of insecurity. In this situation if there js a referendum, we know far certain Tamils will lose and the major, the cardinal, the principal, part of this area of agreement will completely go fetfo thin air. That is why I say initiative has not come from them. You have shown your initiative :we appreciate it. You have taken a bold initiative we applaud it. You have our hope and approval. But Sri Lanka has not shown that kind of initiative. And past history has also proved umpteen number of times that Sri Lankan President never kept his word. And, Sir, it is shameful thing that he 5.00 *-** is the only man, I think, in the twentieth century who is often talking about Lord Buddha and Lord Buddha has become a caricature in Sri Lanka in the mouth of President Jayewardene because nothing is believable. So, \ would like to know from the Government, from the honourable Minister, how long the army will be there because he has said, "Whenever we say, the army will return.". This is found in the Sri Lanka Government-controlled papers. The 16th August deadline was there. But now it remains. We are very happy. But how long are they going to be there, to remove the element of uncertainty that is there? Then, what about the referendum that is going to be held? He says, 'I will go and campaign against this referendum.'. In a referendum, anybody can go for campaigning. But it is something else when it is said by the President and when the President himself says, "I will go and campaign against this referendum.". It is something else then. In a democratic election, for campaigning anybody can go, I can go and say that I am for unification and somebody else can go and say that it should not be so, that the provinces will remain separate, and that is another matter. But for the President, who is to keep these things intact, who is to keep the unity of the country, to say, "I will go and campaign against it." means something else. He gays it. So, we have very many doubts. It is an accord for peace and it is a harbinger of peace and i welcome this accord. We welcome this accord and we stand by it. You have takes the greatest initiative and this accord should be wor-kedout. But we are only pinpointing that they are no): sincere and you are hero to decide and you are here to save the people because believing you onl> they have 'at'd down their arms and your responsibility is all the more now and jf you are not saving the people, that will be the greatest betrayal in India's history. Thank you.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI *H* HANUMANTHAPPA): Now, Mr. Cbim-anbhai Mehta.

SHRI CHIMANBHAI MEHTA (Gujarat): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, at the outset, allow me to say that I welcome this accord although the misgivings expressed by our friends should be kept in mind. But the major realities of South Asia and the security perceptions are the more dominant factors today and one should not ignore them. 1 do> not want to elaborate on the^se perceptions. With a neighbouring country almost on the verge of aquiring an atom bomb and with other neighbouring countries also not so favourably disposed towards us. in such a situation, I know that that accord may not be so ideal, but, in the given situation, what was best has been 'ierived by us from this accord.

I would not say that this has given us a lasting solution. Sir, this idea of a lasting solution is not realistic in international politics because treaties have been signed and they have been abrogated after some months or after some years and Uiis we have seen. Just because we are searching for a lasting solution, for an ideal solution, can we go in for a continuous conflict? In a situation which is not so favourable to us, when we pose the issue like this, I tjjmk this accord was inevitable and this is the maximum that we could hiive derived from this position.

So. the question of minortv versus majority, whether it is in India, whether it is in Canada or whether it is in any

other country, is always a very thorny question and it is a thorny problem. The minority has a tei dency to distrust tha majority and wh n the minorities start fighting against discrimination or injustice, the majority also at least a section of the majority, trt< I ihe stand that the minority is separ; tist. These two stands come into conflu and bloodshed takes place. I know th t Srilankan Tamils or l he Indian Tamik as we call them have been there since senturies. The question of homeland is al o there in our country. Some minorities all. about their own homeland and wi lave not taken such ideas of homelan 1 very favourably became ultimately tl s minority has to merge with the mainstream. Indians are there ihroughout the world They are in Fiji. They are in othe counrties also. In Sri Lanka, they are about 20 per cent. But are *5* I ftf OWt. We have i be very careful in such situations. All the Indians would look towards us. How long can the Governrn nt of India go on expanding conflicts? Or should we request our friends to *m* "ge with them?

As I understam 1'iom Mr. Gopalsamy's speech, the problem is this. That the Northern Provinc and the Eastern Pro vince are to be oerged on the basis of referendum. Then will be one Governor, one Chief Minish \ one Council of Min isters and like tha . Now, in one province Srilankan Tamils have majority. In ano ther Province wh jh is to be merged, i.e. the Eastern Pro[1] bee, there are one-third Srilankan Ti nils, one third Sinhalese and one third T umi] Muslims who are called Moors. You know the trouble in out ci in i y. 1 had been to Fiji two year back. I saw that one Indian was going to be the Prime. Minister because they had the majority. But we always have 9 problem with religious minority. There lso it was projected as a Hindu-Muslim question. Now these ue our own dreations exploited $_{3v}$ imperialists, f in the referendum in Eastern Province, one-third Sinhalese and one-third Moors 8° against merger, then merger won't take place in December 1988. he referendum is going to take place under the supervision of Indian observers. Perhaps the fear is that the Eastern Prov ace would not merger with the Northern Province. One-third separate area is the historical habitation These are the words used in the Agreement. The traditional homeland words have not been used. I want to ask one question. Suppose no merger takes place. 1 am all for merger. I am not interested in the merger not taking place. Suppose the merger does not take place and the referendum is not GO successful as we would like it to be. In such a situation, would the Tamils be thrown out from Sri Lanka? Would they be deprived of jobs which they are having today? I know that the majority there is trying to discriminate. There are extremists there also. But can you overcome that problem through the help of the Government of India or gradually merging with the mainstream. Because Sri Lankan Tamils are more literate and as far as job opportunities are concerned they could do something better also. In the month of January 1 had been there. They said, "you are five crores in Tamil Nadu. Sri Lankans are just around 80 lakhs and 20 lakhs Tamils, are here. Ar$_e$ we not in a minority?" If you go on projecting thi$_s$ minority-majority problem all the time and not try to find a solution then there cannot be any peace. One day you have got to settle this sort of problem. Let us not aggravate the situation.

Here are our Sikh brothers. Some of them, not all. a few went to the extent of thinking in terms of Khalistan. We could not agree to such a thing. They have some problems. We can settle them. In the same way, in the same spirit, what the Accord has done is this: They have opened a new chapter in the sense that there should be accommodation between the two minority and majority ethnic groups. There i$_s$ this accommodation. Therefore, we are sending our Army. Otherwise, why should we send our Army? Is there need at all? And it is a very great risk we have taken upon ourselves, because we are compelled to do so. Now if you go on asking how long you are going to remain there, for five years or 10 years or 20 years, there cannot be any limit. Basically we should prepars our mind to settle the differences. I want to ask one question: Was it possible for 1 the guerillas or the Tigers to establish

peace on their own terms? Was it ever possible? Neither was it possible for Mr. Jayewardene to suppress them completely. I can understand. Guerilla warfare is such a thing in which the regular army cannot defeat the well-equipped guerillas. And these Tigers are getting help from other sources. India is *so* near. The Government of India cannot stop even if they try. From the southern districts of Tamil Nadu help is bound to reach them. So, for Jayewardene it was a problem. How long can he go on fighting? The economy of Sri Lanka was shattering. Inflation was rising. Therefore, they were also under compulsion.

Now we have got a chance to have the unification of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. There is the provision for refer endum. That is the maximum we can help; the two provinces can be united into one province. (Time bell) Suppose if they fail in referendum, what can we do from here in Delhi and from Parlia ment? It is for the Sri Lankan Tamils to win over the Muslim Tamils, the Moors, the Sinhalese. And if they win them over, I think, almost 90 per cent of the problem gets settled. About the Mosad and other things, it ig already there in the Accord. That whole thing is to be dismantled. There are other as pects of the Accord which are also fav ourable. But the most important thing, as my elderly friend, Mr. Kulkarni, has said is this Keep in mind the interna tional background also. India should not look as if quarrelling with all its neigh bours. At least you have shown here that we can come to a settlement. Sir, we have arrived at a settlement although our friends have not liked. I can understand the misgivings of our Tamil friends, which are genuine. You have made big sacrifices and that is also there. But in the interests of the country and in th» interests of longterm peace ____

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. HANUMANTHAPPA): Mr. Mehta, please conclude now.

SHRI CHIMANBHAI MEHTA:.. try to see that you also joia the main-stream of Sri Lanka and bring about * historical, longterm, lasting solution and India and Sri Lanka remain as friends as they were before. Thank your very much.

THEL VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI H. HANUMANTHAPPA): Hon. Members, as the Hon. Minister has to go to attend a meeting, I would request the Members to be brief and precise.

THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI K. NATWAR SINGH): Sir, it is not that I do not attach importance to the meeting here. But the thing is that I have to attend a meeting of the Consultative Committee on Foreign Affairs/ to discuss Sri Lanka at 6.30 p.m.

SHRI M. S. GURUPADASWAMY (Karnataka); Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, 1. do not speak for a long time.

SHRI CHITTA BASU (West Bengal): Sir, since a meeting of the Consultative Committee has been called on this very subject and we are also Memberj there and we are very much willing to speak in this forum, how can the Minister attend both the meetings? How will it be possible? So, I think that meeting should be postponed.

SHRI M. S. GURUPADASWAMY: Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, Sri Lanka and the problem of Tamil minorities has heen discussed several times in this House. Now we are discussing this problem in a new context. For the last four years there were three parties which participated in the negotiations, the Government of Sri Lanka, the Government of India and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. These were the three parties all these four years which were talking with each other to reach an understanding, but somehow suddenly these tripartite negotiations became bilateral, trilateral became bilateral. The accord was signed not between all these three parties. The accord was signed between two parties, the Government of Sri Lanka on the one side and the Government of India on the other. Tamils are nowhere in the picture. They are not the signatories to this accord.

Maybe, for vai IOUS reasons and compulsions they have accepted the accord, but they ar© not he signatories. Secondly, The Governmen of India played the role of a mediator ; 11 along.

The Vice Cb Jnnan (Shri Jagesh Desai) in ihe Chair.

But now, Gc/emmem has become a party, not a mi diator. It changed its position dramatica ly. So, the destiny of ethnic minoritie in Sri Lanka was decided by two p rties, the Government of India and the 3overnment of Sri Lanka, with the hesit; nt acceptance by various Tamil groops. I feel this is one of the weakness of tie accord.

Secondly, *hew* can the Government of India take re ponsibility on itself to implement the accord? It has taken that responsibility, md the Government of Sri Lanka has conceded that the Government of India should take the burden of seeing through the settlement, I do not want to go ato other technical questions here, whether it was technically right on the rart of the Government of India to station its troops in Sri Lanka. The only thin * that disturbs me in my mind is, if the accord is not implemented, if there is trouble again, if Tamilians are not satisfiel, if they agitate or revolt, whether the Government of India will use its troops to subdue their protest, to kill their reaction. This is one of the worries in my mind.

The other worry is about the referendum which i_s part and parcel of the accord. To my mind, this ig the Achillies' heel of the accord. Referendum has got to be fair, an 1 if it has to be fair, then all those Tan il_s who have gone out of the Northern and Eastern provinces, should come back and settle there and those Sinhalese who have settled there, should be taken out. In other words, conditions for referendum should be created and it si ould be acceptable to the Tamil minoriues there. So, I would like to ask my fnend whether it is going to happen, whether referendum can take place, or will take place at all within the scheduled time. Assuming that if the referendum is held, what will happen to the political system there which has been envisaged in the accord? According to the accord, Mr. Vice-Chairman, both these provinces should become united; there should be a Council; there should be a Ministry; there should be a Governor. If the referendum goes against the unity, for some reason or the other, if the Eastern province does not want to stay with Northern province if it separates itself from the northern province, what will happen to the political set-up? What will happen to the Members who will be elected to the Council? What will happen to the Ministry? What will happen to the Governor? I woud like to ask. If there is separation of the two provinces after the referendum, we will come back to the same position from where we began. If perchance, there i_g a vote against the merger of the two provinces, the purpose, the main objective, of the accord will be undone. It may lead to a lot of complications. This is another lacuna in the accord.

Thirdly, no steps have been taken by the Sri Lankan Government so far — the time is short, no doubt -- to create conditions immediately to enable the three lakh people, Tamil people, who have left Sri Lanka to come back and settle there. This is another important thing which has to be borne in mind

Finally, I say, the accord ig good or bad only in its implementation. I do not want to go into the whole thing for want of time. The accord is bad if it is not implemented. The accord is good if it is implemented. Sir, the success of the accord depends upon how it is going to be implemented. With these words, I say that we have to watch and we cannot pass any judgement on this accord now. The Prime Minister may say that this accord is historic. It may be $_s$o. But we have to watch and reserve our judgement. Thank you.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI): There are five or six speakers more and then the hon. Minister will reply. We have to complete this debate by 6.30 p.m. I will request hon. Members to be as brief as possible.

SHKI B. SATYANARAVAN REDDY (Andhra Pradesh): Mr. Vice-Cha.rman Sir, I am very happy that the strife and bloodshed has ended as a result of this agreement between India and Sri Lanka. This agreement was signed on 29th July between the President of Sri Lanka and the Indian Prime Minister. Sir, the con-llict between the ethnic Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority goes back to June 5, 1956 when the then Prime Minister, Shri S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike introduced in Parliament the language Bill, "the Only Sinhala Bill." Then, the Sri Lankan Tamil protested against this discrimination and they offered Satya-graha. During these three decades, nearly 16.000 people lost their lives. In the last four years, many hundreds of people lost their lives and a lot of property has been destroyed. But we are happy that as a result of this agreement signed on 29th July, this has all ended. At the same time, we have some doubts. We have to see whether this Agreement, in spit* of the good intention behind it. will be successful. The question i* whether it will be implemented in letter and spirit. The thing that creates doubt in our mind i_s that India has all along pleaded that she is not a party to the conflict and that it is only playing a mediatory role, that the conflict was between the Sri Lankan Government and its own Tamil speaking ethnic people. But now we have become a party to the agreement and the very party - the Ethnic section of Tamils of Sri Lankan people - who were fighting with the Sri Lankan Government against injustice is not a party to the agreement. That ig the main problem. How are y^{ou} going to implement this agreement, both in letter and spirit, without the consent of the militant section of people who were fighting for justice and rights all these days and who had suffered a lot in thi_s fighting? That is the most impor hint thing. T would like to know from the Minister a_s to how Government of India is going to implement this agreement without the consent of that section of the pepole who were fighting all these days, so that it is successful. That is one of the most important points that is agitating the mindlt of the people.

Secondly, Government of India has taken a heavy burden on its shoulderg by this agreement. It is not that ihe success of the agreement depends upon the people of Sri Lanka alone it depend* afcsa on the cooperation of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka including Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Government. It is to be Been how Government of India which has become a party to this agreement cnlfils the responsibility that lies on it course, Sri Lankan Government i» also a party to it. But we cannot only dedpend on it. There is distrust between the Sri Lankan people and Sri Lankan Government. So a great burden lies on the Government of India to see that this i^ree-ment. is fully implemented.

Thirdly, it seems a large section *A* the Sinhala people are against this agreement and there are some reservations *so* tar as. militant groups are concerned - like the I.TTE and others, who are nor. a party to the agreement. They have said in so many words that there was no other choice but to accept the agreement for the time being. But a section o€ Sinhala people have o^inly demortSMWed and acted against the agreement. More especially the Prime Minister and cnem-bers of the Cabinet have spoken ->enly against the agreement. I do not know whether they have changed their minds and whether Government of India have got any confirmed information from Sri Lanka whether the Prime Minister of that country has changed his views? I would like to know this from the hon. Minister.

Then, as I have said, the Indian Government and the Indian army have to carry on a great burden on their shoulders. As a matter of fact. Mr Jaye-wardene has sought military help not only from India but also military help from the United States of America, Pakistan, Israel and China. T do not know why? When he has accepted Indian help, then why he has appealed for military help from these countries. 1 would Hke the hon. Minister to enlighten us on this subject because this is what is causing a

lot of agitation n the minds of people and create furthe trouble*

SHRI V. C bPALSAMY: Biggest hyprocrite.

SHRl B. SAT^ ANARAYAN REDDY: Mr, Jayawardene says the conflict has been avoided, bi t this could have been done long ago. Mr. Jayavvardene said at the time of the i igning of this agreement that in the past re was unwise, unintelligent and unimaginative.

Now *be has* I .'come courageous, intell-igent and wise. I hope he will not turn unintelligent, tin /ise and uncourageous again. He must mplement the agreement. The agreement ./ants - that the Tamil people of Sri 1. nka should live in honour, dignity and freedom for which they were fighting a] these days. I think we will have to cary Jayawardene on our shoulders to in plement this agreement.

There is anotl ;r point on which I want to express my iews. Suppose Jayawardene falls - if 1 ; is defeated and he has no power - then what will happen to this agreement - because a section of the Sinhalese a e not in favour of this agreement? The 1 we have to wait how the Government of India will play its, role to see that it i$_s$ implemented?

This agreeme t is most ambigous not clear, on many iroblems. So I would like to have from lie honourable Minister a clarification on devoluting powers.

Sir, many of the militant Tamil groups especially LTT ;. and others-have many reservations. They are not very happy about this agre(ment. For the time being they have accepted it but we do not know how they are g ling to act in future. So I would like to know because you had conducted the negotiations and talks with these groups - whether the Government of India has any clear understanding that these groups accept this agreement into to and the/ will not have asy reservations. This ii also important.

Then, Sir, the most important is subclause (2) of clause 6 which is about a referendum. This is a most dangerous clause in the agreement. When you have come to the conclusion that the Sri Lankan Tamils should live in honour, dignity and freedom by having single province by merging North and East then why again are you creating this uncertainty by having thi$_s$ clause of referen-dum in the East? This will again create trouble and there will not be any peace in that part of the country. So, even now it is better to see that the referendum clause be deleted. Also, the Tamil provinces of both the north and the east should become one single unit without any further referendum and the Tamils there must have full freedom to manage their own affairs.

Now, the agreement ha$_s$ to be ratified by the Sri Lankan Parliament. It is not yet done. It was to be done by the 18th of this month but I think now they ate s a v i n g ii will be done in September or October. 1 do not know how much time they will lake and whether ii. will be ratified. This is also a most important thing which is agitating the minds of the people both in Sri Lanka and in India.

Then, I have to pay my homage to the three brave Indian soldiers who have lai$_t$i down their lives in the course of performing their duties in Sri Lanka. I also send my condolences to the members of bereaved families. The Indian Army there has to fight on two fronts. One is against the Tamil people themselves if they do not lay down their arms. There are reports that still many of the militant groups have not laid down their arms because they have got their reser-vations and, in that case, the Indian Army has to fight against those Tamils. I want to know whether the Government of [ndia is ready to do that.

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: Then it will be the worst disaster.

SHRI B. SATYANARAYAN REDDY: Yes, then it will be a disaster. The other front is, when these arms are surrendered to the Indian Army. Then it has to fight

[Shri B. Satyanarayan Reddy]

against the Sinhalese majority to establish peace in the other parts of Sri Lanka. Both ways the Indian Army has to face this difficulty. I would like to know j from the Minister how he is going to solve this problem.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI): Now all your points are over.

SHRI B. SATYANARAYAN REDDY I have to say what happens, Sir. Lastly Sir, by this agreement, a great injuslio has been done to stateless Tamils in Sr Lanka who have been living there foi hundteds of years and who do not want to leave Sri Lanka. But by this agreement, | about, two lakhs of stateless Tamil Indians have to be repatriated to India and in exchange 1,50,000 Tamilian refugees j have to be sent back to Sri Lanka. I I would like to say that this is most in- » justice. They are living in Sri Lanka for g hundreds of years. So, this should not *i* have been done. All Tamil refugees in I India should be allowed to go to Sri | Lanka to live in peace and dignity. Lastly, t I would say ..... |

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI jf JAGESH DESAI): Your last point never | comes.

SHRI B. SATYANARAYAN REDDY: It is over. About more than 5,000 Tamil « people are in jails, and only a few of *'i* them have been released. Many of th> are still languishing in the jails. would like to know whether all will be released immediately, because reports say that many families are waiting, their family members are waiting to receive | them, but they do not find them. And one Reverend Bishop has stated in a | public statement that 600 of the prisoners who had been arrested, have disappeared. I do not know where they have gone. . But he says that they might have been liquidated. So, the Government of India must see to it and see that every person who has been arrested and who are in jail are released and is safely gent to thcii homes. i

Also, the 200 military camps that have been established in the eastern and northern parts of Sri Lanka should be closed, and the Sri Lankan military should be sent to the barracks.

Lastly I would say that this agreement •should be ircolemented fully so that there will be permanent peace in Sri Lanka and there must oe permanent friendship between India and Sri Lanka. Thank you.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI): Mr. Jaswant Singh. You are known for your pointed questions. So, I would request you to speak in your old style so that the least time is consumed,

SHRI JASWANT SINGH (Rajastban): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, mindful of the effects that the tedium of this debate has already had on the hon. Minister of State, I shall be very brief.

Sir, first, at the very outset, I think, it is very necessary to state that some of the terms being used, are not in their proper context. This is called the "Sri Lanka agreement". As far as the Government of India is concerned, I have such a superstitious dread about the use *Si* the word "accord" that I am glad that the Government has chosen to adopt this new word "agreement."

And who can possibly oppose political resolutions of complex and violent etnnic, social and liKtor'cal conflicts? I don't th'nk the essence of today's discussion is about opposing such a political resolution or supporting such a political resolution. Unquestionably, however, there is significant of some aspects of this agreement, we would be blind if we do not take note of those points. The first is, at the time of the signing of this agreement, a large part of Sri Lanka was under curfew, Colombo was closed. It is extremely[1] regrettable that the person of our Prime Minister was assaulted by a Sri Lankan naval rating, in a guard of honour. It is also now a fact that there is delay, recognised delay in the surrender

of arms. There is significance in all these things, and ve would be blind not to take note of these things.

The second, w iose irony, I am sure, is not lost one th hon. Minister of State, is the fact that at the time of the signing of this agreemen , the Sri Lankan Premier and indeed iome other members of the Sri Lankan < Cabinet deliberately abstained themselves from which we come to the second fa tor of significance, and it i_s a legitimate query which a number of other speakers have refrerred to: Between whom is this agreement. I_s it between Presides layawardene and Pr me Minister C andhi? Or is it between them as Heads of their Governments or as individuals? 1 is right, as has been pointed out by . number of speakers, this conflict is e m c, it is social and it ha_s a historical rigins. Therefore, does this agreement o accord tend to appear as an arrangemeni between two individuals or is it a serious and lasting commitment of two Governments? Is it a settlement of contending iss es or does it only convey a temporary impression of a palliative?

Sir, I am led o a conclusion and the conclusion is thai given the circumstances in which this agisement has been arrived at, the best I can do is call to it; from a basketful of bad i rations, possibly this was the least bad option. Then, it takes me to other conclusions which are that if a Government, any Government, particularly our Government, i_s reduced to a situation wherein it can a ily pluck out an option which we call tie least bad from lot of other bad optior;; then that, I think by itself is a comn jnt certainly on our Sri Lanka policy an on the conduct of our diplomacy as far as the past three or four years are concei ned.

Sir, I do not vish now, in the current euphoria, to make a reference to the fiasco about the pisode of relief ships or of the air-droppi ig of food packets. I am nevertheless struck by the hon. Prime Minister assertin : that this is 'the agreement of the cen tiry. in the whole world. which he subsequently rectified to say, if not the whole wi rid, possibly this country.

Now, this is a remark redolent of his characteristic modesty. The best I can do or hope is that the Prime Minister is even partially right. Even if it ig not the agreement of the ceniury, I do hope for the sake of India, for the sake of Indo-Sri Lankan relations that he is partially right.

S.r, I would like to caution this Government what we have ahead of us a very long haul, of brickbats and bad news, not b^uqets. Therefore, in ail sincerely, I would like to advise this Government, do not raise public expectations about this accord. Tamper your public pronouncement with realism. It is a very long haul. It will challenge the nation. It Will call for the best from this Government as indeed from the Opposition. It will call and hope for the best from our Armed Forces. It is an unwise posture that the Government of India is presently adopting ag if the signing of the agreement itself is a great achievement. It is no doubt a step forward. But it is a small step forward and in the very tak'.ng of that step you have created, generated in its consequence a host of other problems which will challenge this Government and possibly even successive Governments.

Sir, I would come to the specific questions and then I will conclude. As I started by saying, the sheer wear and tear of the tedium of this debate is telling on the hon. Minister of State. I am given to understand that some time later he has to go and discuss Sri Lanka again in a committee meeting. I do not, therefore, wish to prolong $h!_s$ agony. There are certain intriguing aspects of this agreement.

SHRI K. NATWAR SINGH: Not only my agony but yours too.

SHRI IASWANT SINGH: Mine too, because my agony is on two accounts. My agony on the second account % that I know that whatever clarifications I seek for, $I_s$hall not receive satisfactory replies to. Therefore, from the very beginning, in the very process of making this intervention, I have to start with the fore knowledge of that impending frustration. Now, I recognise that the Minister of State for

[Shri Jaswant SinghJ External Affairs is inhibited. He will, perhaps, not be able to give me all the carifkations (.hat 1 ask for. I understand why he won't be able to do so. He won't be able to do so because this is one of the fundamental weaknesses of this Agreement. If he were to clarify the points that I am going to ask, in the wake of these clarincatiins, further controversies and complications would ar.se. Such is the fragile and tenuous nature of this agreement. If it wa$ an agreement of issues, then we would not be faced with such a fragility. However, let me come to the intriguing aspects on which I would re-quest the Minister to shed light. Firstly, about the rale of the Indian miliary. A number of speakers have alluded to this. there are however, two or three specific aspects of the role of the Indian military which I do feel, not perhaps with the agreement, but certainly to us in India and certainly to the armed forces themselves, which are vital. One of the worst things that the armed forces can be entrusted with the areas in wh.ch their roles, their tasks, their responsibilities are left grey and undefined. The military mind finds it extremely difficult 10 operate professionally and efficiency where their task is not a clear, categorical assigned task. Task (a) responsibility. If the task is (a) to (z) and that is the responsibility of the Indian military, then Ihe Indian military shall rounder, and it is a matter on which the Government should reflect very deeply what precisely is it that we expect the Indian armed forces to do in their peace keeping role, how will they keep that 'peace', given the complexity of the situation, which I do not have to elaborate upon, which some of the earlier speakers have already referred to? There is the knowledge that we already have of the perils of peace keeping roles and I am merely referring to West Asia or earlier historical examples. Are we entering into some such new arena[7] Are we prepared for it mentally? Have we taken into account the various contingencies? There is, then, Sir, in this role of the military the aspect of the totality of India's security concerns and some hon. speakers have referred to this aspect also earlier. Wo are given to understand that some .wi.er$_9$ have been exchanged with refercu,.. jjditicularly to tne fact and future of ii.ucomalee, of the setting up of a Voice vjt America Station, of the setting up ox un Oil Storage Yard, of the presence ui certain external forces in Sri Lanxa, me.r withdrawal and of the recog-naiiun LU Jndia's legitimate, rightful, indeed due pniuacy as far a« our security aspects are Jivolved. The question specifically here .s that—and he is a very eminent diplomat with the life-time of experience in tnai held—he should ask this questioa hirnsei., not necessary, that he replies me, what is the status of letters exchanged which do not constitute a part of an agreement even as appendices? Those letters do not form part of the agreement. What is the status, what will be the status tomorrow, the next year etc. And this is matter which we ought to reflect on deeply, not raise exaggerated expectations and hopes about. Secondly, as there were certain bidden aspects of the autonomy the loose ends ol autonomy, the eastern province etc. and because the other speakers have alrecdy mentioned these factors, I shall not refer to them. There is also a certain amount of ambiguity in the devolution of power.:. In fact, there is a step back iron* the December 19 proposals and in that sense, it is not as satisfactory as it is being nude out to be. However, if the Sri kankan Tamils find it satisfactory, if the Government of India finds it satisfactory, there is nothing sacrosanct about December 19". It is not as if December 19 is a deit. v ich we must, in perpetuity, worship, i'.iough, in regard to the authorship of i - December 19 proposals, the hon. Min er of State had his own contribution;, t make, the December 19 proposals have been jettisoned, thrown away. I am not worried about it. But I think there net > 38 a certain amoun of clarification ied on this aspect.

There is this aspect of equating refugees wis 'oatriates and other speakers have met i d about Sirimavo Shastri Accord an • ; 150,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refug ist 200,000 Indias. This is reope ■ o the chapter. However, the Govern Tit of India have reopened the chapter for some logic good. Please explain to us w ;at that logic good is. The powers ef

the provincial government have not been defined. The role of police has not been defined. The fear$_s$ c the LTTE is the next point needing elaboration. They have been very graphically outlined by my previous speaker Mr. < lopalsamy. *I* do not repeat all that. But think, Mr. Prabha-karan has been saying in public about the fear$_s$ of the LTTE ; nd the hon. Minister must comment on th :m.

Finally, Sir, on the question of Sri Lankan Parliament's role. We all know that the Sri Lanka; Parliament has not ratified it. The Sri ^ankan President has gone on record sayug that if the Parliament does not acceit, if his Parliament does not accpet—Tr ink God, our Prime Minister does not s;y that if it is not approved unaniomousl *U* I will dissolve the Parliament—he will dissolve it. The Sri Lankan President h; s certainly stated that if the Parliament Joes not agree with him, he will dissolve that Parliament. Now, if the Sri Lankan Parliament does not ratify it, legally it night not make any difference to the a; ecment. But it would make a very substantial difference to the tone, the atmosphei | and the ambience in which the agreement, has to be implemented.

There are two concluding thoughts. I am sure the hon. Min iter is aware of them. I am sure he will not shed any light on these. Our role in the past four or five years and in this igreement has implications which are no frittering to India and we would -be mak jg a mistake if we do not take note of tr J consequences of these implications. Sonic earlier speakers referred to the courage of t.he Prime Minister in arriving at this agreement. It is a subjective judgment nd equally subjectively some others migh say differently.

What one calls onrage, the other might call foolhardiness It is often found in military equations also. One man's courage is another man's" oolhardiness.. Only time will' tell whether f was courage or it was foolhardiness.

Finally, Sir, it is a fall out, internal fall out of the recommending or accepting of a referendum in the Eastern Pro* 918 RS—4 '

vince and there is an internal fall out out which will affect our internal politics. The Government of India would do well *to* reflect on that aspect also. As I started by saying, of course, who can possibly disagree with that which is a political settlement of a deep-seated ethnic strife?" But is it a settlement? Is it really an agreement?

6 00 P,M,

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह (बिहार) : उपसभाध्यक्ष महोदय, जब हमारे प्रधान मंत्री ने श्रीलंका समझौता कर के भारत की भूमि पर पदार्पण किया तो यहां ऐसा वातावरण बनाया गया जैसे बहुत बड़ा युद्ध जीतकर आए हों या कोई बड़ी विजय हासिल कर के आए हों । ऐसा लगता था कि उन्होंने कोई विजय हासिल की है ।

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI): Since the Business Advisory Committee has 6aid that trie House can sit beyond 6 o'clock, I seek your permission.

SHRI K. NATWAR SINGH: I think there are still more Members to speak but I have to go to the Consultative Committee meeting in the Annexe and it will be in a way impolite if I am not thefe before the Member$_s$ get there...

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAI): Mr Matto is not here. Mr. Chitta Basu is the last speaker.

SHRI V. GOPALSAMY: The Minister can give the reply tomorrow.

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : महोदय, यह कहा गया कि यह ऐतिहासिक समझौता हुआ है । इसमें कोई शक नहीं है कि अपनी तरफ से, अपने ढंग का यह समझौता ऐतिहासिक है । ऐतिहासिक इस माने में जरुर है कि जिन पार्टियों के बीच समझौता होना है, जिनको शर्तों को मानना है वे तो अलग हैं, उनमें से एक पार्टी है भारत सरकार जिसको समझौते को नहीं मानना है, वह पार्टी जा करके हस्ताक्षर करती है । मतलब यह है कि

[श्री राम अवधेश सिंह]

दूसरी पार्टी की ओर से जबरिए उसका झगड़ा अपने ऊपर लेना है । ऐकार्ड सफल होता है तब तो कोई बात नहीं है, लेकिन अगर श्रीलंका सरकार इसे नहीं मानती है और वहां के तमिल निवासी इसे नहीं मानते हैं तो दोनों हालतों में भारत सरकार को उससे उलझना पड़ेगा और झगड़ना पड़ेगा और नाहक भारत सरकार ने यह खेल खेला है । मेरी समझ में, जैसी सूचनाएं आ रही हैं उनसे लगता है कि भारत सरकार फंस गई है । मुझे लगता है कि यह जल्दी में समझौता क्यों हुआ, मैं आपको बताता हूं । मई महीने के भारत आखीर में जब यह संसद बंद हो रही थी तो सरकार के एक अफसर ने मुझसे कहा कि आप लोगों ने बोफोर्स कांड पर भारत सरकार के खिलाफ जो झमेला खड़ा किया है या जो फेयर फैक्स से सबमैरीन्स की हवा तैयार हुई है भारत सरकार के खिलाफ, उसकी काट तैयार की जा रही है । भारत सरकार को मालूम है, श्री राजीव गांधी को मालूम है कि उत्तर भारत में अब हम टिकने वाले नहीं हैं, उत्तर भारत से हम जाने वाले हैं, तो दक्षिण भारत से ऐसी चीज तैयार की जाए कि तमिलनाडु और दक्षिण भारत के लोग हमारे साथ हो जाएं और इसी जल्दीबाजी में समझौता करना था कि तमिल लोगों को खुश किया जा सके । यहां प्रभाकरन साहब को बुलाकर भारत सरकार ने अपनी कस्टडी में रखा । उनसे बातचीत में कोई राय नहीं ली और राय भी ली तो उन्होंने कह दिया कि हम नहीं मानते । उन दिनों के अखबारों को तो आप सब ने पढ़ा होगा, देखा होगा कि प्रभाकरन साहब ने उसका विरोध किया था, जबरदस्त विरोध किया था । इस जबरदस्त विरोध के बावजूद जब यहां पर बोफोर्स कांड की हवा संसद में गरम थी और दोनों सदनों में बहस हो रही थी बोफोर्स कांड पर तो उस समय भारत के प्रधान मंत्री की भारत की संसद के प्रति जवाबदेही नहीं थी, जवाबदेही की जिम्मेदारी नहीं थी, उनको याद नहीं था कि हमको यहां जवाब देना है ? भारत की जनता के मन में जो गुस्सा और संदेह था उसका जवाब देते ।

उस समय वह संसद को जवाब देने के बजाय दौड़ कर लंका गये और लंका में उन्होंने जो समझौता किया वह हमारे गले में एक अजीबोगरीब हड्डी अटक गयी । फर्ज कीजिए जैसा हमारे साथी गोपाल-सामीजी ने कहा 30 जुलाई को ही जयवर्धने साहब ने कहा कि हम अमेरिका, चाइना' इजराइल की सहायता मांगेंगे । मान लीजिए तमिल लोगों ने अपने हथियार सुपुर्द कर दिये । जब हथियार उन्होंने सुपुर्द कर दये तो क्या नतीजा होगा । जो काम जयवर्धने के लिए, उनकी मिलिटरी के लिए असंभव था, जाफना से, नार्थ और पूर्वी इलाके से मिलिटरी के लिए कम से कम घुस कर उनके हाथों से, उनके घरों से हथियार निकालना असंभव था उस काम को जयवर्धने ने बड़ी चालाकी से भारतीय सेना के जरिये करा लिया । उसमें सफलता प्राप्त की । क्या एग्रीमेंट में ऐसा है कि जयवर्धने कहेंगे कि आप अपनी सेना ले जाओ इसके बावजूद भी क्या हम रखेंगे ? फर्ज कीजिए जैसी आज आवाज आ रही हैं तमिल लोग कहते हैं और संसद सदस्यों की भी मांग है कि कम से कम 10 साल तक सेना रखी जाये जबकि जयवर्धने कहते हैं कि नहीं, आपने हथियार डाल दिये अब आप वापस चले जाइये तो क्या भारत की सेना वहां रह सकेगी ? क्या आप एग्रीमेंट के मुताबिक रख सकते हैं ? उस हालत में अगर आप कहते हैं कि नहीं मैं रखूंगा तब भी एग्रीमेंट का वायलेशन है क्योंकि एग्रीमेंट में स्पष्ट लिखा हुआ है जिस क्षण श्रीलंका प्रेजीडेंट जयवर्धने कहेंगे कि आप सेना वापस ले जाओ उसी समय आपको सेना वापस ले जानी पड़ेगी । जब सेना वापस ले जायेंगे तो फिर वह अमेरिकी फौज बुलाते हैं या और किसी को सहायता के लिए बुलाते हैं और हथियार से रहित तमिलों पर कहर

ढाते हैं । मैं आपके माध्यम से कहना चाहता हूं कि उन कारणों की खोज इस एग्रीमेंट में नहीं की गयी है जिन कारणों से वहां बगावत हुई। आखिर बगावत क्यों हुई ? (**समय की घंटी**) मेरे साथ हर बार अन्याय होता है ।

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री जगेश देसाई) : मैंने चार मिनट कहा था आपके 8 मिनट हो गये ।

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : पार्टी के हिसाब से चार मिनट नहीं होते कम से कम 8 या 10 मिनट होते हैं । थे तीन-चार मिनट में कैसे बैठ सकता हू ।

SHRI V. GOP iLSAMY: Sir, the Minister also should n t be placed in a position to make his spee< h in a hurry because we want to hear hir at length. He said that he wants at leas half an hour. My submission, therefor^, is that the honourable Min.'ster may sp> ak tomorrow.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI IA-GESH DESAI): Yes, the Minister is replying only tomorrow because there is no time now.

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : दो-तीन मिनट और लूंगा । मैं उन कारणों की ओर आपका ध्यान खींचना चाहता हूं जिन कारणों से वहां बगावत हुई । ब्रिटिश हुकूमत के जाने के बाद जब वहां जनतंत्र बहाल हुआ तो वहां के तमिल लोगों के मन में भी इच्छा पैदा हुई कि हम भी बराबरी के तौर पर वहां रहें। हमारे लोगों को राजपाट में हिस्सा मिले। हमारे लोगों को सरकारी मशीनरी में हिस्सा मिले । इंजीनियरिंग कालेज में एडमिशन हो, मेडिकल कालेज में एडमिशन हो और इन्जीनियरिंग कालेज में एडमिशन हो मेडिकल कालेज में एडमिशन हो और इंजीनियरिंग कालेज में एडमिशन हो, मेडिकल कालेज में एडमिशन हो और पुलिस में और पलटन में हो और सरकार में उनको हिस्सा मिले । लेकिन उनको जान-बूझकर हिस्सेदारी नहीं दी जा रही हैं । इसका नतीजा यह हुआ कि वहां बगावत हुई और वे लोग आज अटोनोमी की मांग कर रहे हैं । श्रीलंकन सरकार से उसको हिस्सेदारी नहीं मिल रही हैं । आज यही स्थिति हमारे यहां भी हैं । इस मुल्क में भी वही चल रहा है । यहां मुट्ठी भर लोग शासन में बैठे हुए हैं । हमारे देश में जो हरिजन, पिछड़े वर्ग के लोग आदिवासी और माइनोरिटीज हैं, जो इस देश में 87 परसेंट से भी ज्यादा हैं, उनको हिस्सेदारी नहीं मिल रही है । यहां भी आज या कल यह बगावत होगी यह सरकार हथियारों की बात सुनती है । सरकार लात से ही बात सुनती है, बात से यह सरकार सुनने वाली नहीं है ।

उपसभाध्यक्ष (श्री जगेशदेसाई) : आपके 12 मिनट हो गये हैं । अब आप समाप्त कीजिये ।

श्री राम अवधेश सिंह : मैं एक वाक्य में समाप्त कर रहा हूं मैं निश्चित तौर पर कह सकता कि यह जो समझौता है यह विफल होगा और भारत सरकार को और राजीव गांधी जी को बहुत ही गहरा मूल्य चुकाना पड़ेगा क्योंकि जिस जल्दी में यह समझौता हुआ है और यह सोच कर हुआ है कि तमिलनाडु की जनता अगले चुनावों में हमारा साथ देगी, वह चुनावों में साथ नहीं देगी और जिस प्रकार से हरियाणा में हुआ है उसी प्रकार से दक्षिण भारत भी आपको जवाब देगा, सारे उत्तर भारत में भी वही हालत होगी ।

SHRI CHITTA BASU (West Bengal): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, this treaty has both positive and negative aspects. For me, it is not a matter of hilarous euphoria, nor a matter of outright condemnation and rejection. A balanced approach is needed and with your kind permission, I shall set out some of the points.

[Shri Chitta Basu]

The Agreement meets some of the important aspirations which have animated the Tamil minorities in Sri Lanka for the prolonged and long drawn-out struggle. This is from the statement of the hon. Minister. These aspects are.(l) the desire to be recognised as a distinct ethnic entity; (2) political autonomy or managing their political future; (3) an appropriate devolution of governmental power to meet the objective; (4) the recognition of the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka as areas of historic habitation of the Tamils and (5) acknowledgement of the designation of Tamil as an official language of Sri Lanka.

These are some ot I he basic aspiration which animated the Sri Lanka Tamils in their long drawn-out struggle. I believe that there should be a total approach to the Agreement as well as the letters exchanged between the two Governments. An analysis of the different clauses and subclauses of the Agreement as well as the letters exchanged between the two Governments brings forth two propositions. One is that India agrees to "lend its military support including the presence of its troops in helping Sri Lanka restore .ethnic peace. Now, I want a clarification from the Minister at this stage. As a corollary, it may be presumed that India is also bound to help Sri Lanka' in the matter of meeting the challenge now being thrown by the JVP movement. The second proposition is that in return, Sri Lanka hag agreed to meet or accommodate,some of India's regional security concern As it has already been mentioned. I do not like to elaborate it. They got Trinsomalee. The Government of Sri T-auka has agreed that Trincomalee or any other parts of Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interest. Again, in return, Sri Lanka has agreed that the Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organisations will bo reviewed. So far so good. Therefore, it hag got both positive aspects and negative aspects. But again what commitment our Government had to make? That has also to be taken into account. India on its part has agreed that it will deport all Sri Lankan citizens indulging in terrorist activities or advocating separation or secession. I do not know what is the burden behind it. India would provide training facilities and military supplier for Sri Lankan security forces, etc. etc. From these, it i_s quite apparent that India—I am sorry to make tnis comment—would not mind aligning with a regime of a neighbouring country if that neighbouring country is prepared to meet India's regional security concern. This, according to me, is the new Indian Monroe doctrine.

Regarding its negative aspects, Sir, 1 would only mention one or two. There has been a promise that the northern and eastern provinces will be united into a single administrative unit. And according to them, this will give the Tamils a sense of homeland. Sir, it is tenable, it is not correct. It is fragile because it depends upon the referendum which the Tamils cannot win. It is not necessary for me to explain because other friends have already expla.ned it. And Mr. Jayewardene did no! make it any secret. As a result of what he has said, it may be a trap for the Sri Lankan Tamils. The only tangible gain out of the agreement which may go to the Tamils is that their Tamil language has been recognised as an official language. But that does not prevent the majority Sinhalese chauvinist, a revengeful Government to continue discrimination which is being perpetrated against them which has also been explained by my predecessors. Therefore, there has not been any major gain for the Tamils in Sri Lanka. And this agreement also does not provide any guarantee to the Sri Lankan Tamils against discrimination and' disabilities which they are suffering from.

Lastly, Sir, there have been many disturbing phenomena. One is that the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka and the Security Minister, right from the beginning, have objected to the agreement. And it is quite well-known that the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka and the Security Minister have got, what I may say, prowest affiliations. It is also known that there is a threat. to the stability of the Jayewardene Government today. It is also known that the SLAP, the major opposition party in Sri Lanka, has not accepted the agreement and they are

likely to rouse the feelings of the Sinhalese. It is also known that the Buddhist bigotry is also eirig sought to be roused. All these are negative features. Therefore, I do not call tiis an event for euphoria, nor do 1 call it in event of condemnation and rejection. Whether the positive aspects will predominate over the negative aspects, the time las not come to give the judgement, nor am I in a position to give Ll.c }udgen frit. But I do feel it is a step towards tt iolution of a political problem in a political way keeping in mind that stan(of the people of India and of the Go\ ;rnment of India has always been to s e that a solution to the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka emerges within the unitt d federal Sri Lanka. Therefore, it is i step in that direction because it does lot disrupt the unity of Sri Lanka. It also brings forth certain hopes 1 *K* federealism for Sri Lanka which my ultimately bring in harmony betwet 1 different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka wl ich will be good for the people of Sri L; nka as well as India because that clear: the condition for the improvement of security environment to which we have iieen reduced.

SHRI GHUL/M RASOOL MATTO (lammu and K ishmir): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, I am very grateful to you for accommodating 1 le at this last stage.

In Internation 1 Agreements, as we all know, there is a >vays a spirit of give and take. I have heai i with rapt attention the speeches that we e made in this House and it was given out that there were some positive aspects o the agreement and there were certain neg itive aspects of the agree ment. But in int. rnational agreements like this, we have to draw a Balance-Sheet and when you draw I Balance-Sheet, you have to find out whe her the positive aspects outweigh the negative aspects or *vice-versa* I find in this Agreement that positive aspects far outweigh the negative aspects. It is a good agreement and I see this Agreement from an entirely different angle. There is no doubt that everybody in India from Kashmir to Kanya Kumari ha; had and continues to have good and brotherly feelings for our Tamilian brethren. Everyone without party affiliations has been supporting their legitimate cause. That being so, we have tried to espouse their cause. But I see this agreement in a different perspective and that perspective to my mind % the Security Environment. My personal view is that if this Agreement had not come about during the course of the foreseeable future, I think Sri Lanka would have become another Diego Garcia or things like that would have happened. I congratulate the Hon. Prime Minister and his Government that they have averted that position and we have in our neighbourhood a country which will be very friendly to us for all time to come. That has been ensured by different agreements and the letters exchanged between the Government of India and Government of Sri Lanka To my mind, this is a very great issue and we cannot think of a greater achievement. I feel that this was a question, I do not know whether the Hon. Minister of State would agree with me, but as a layman I feel that it was a question of time and if within the next seven days after we entered into the agreement, I mean that if it had been delayed by another seven days only, things would have been different and Sinhalese extremists would have taken over and Jayewardene would have been in a very precarious position. I may be wrong but that is my personal view. *(Interruptions)* Having said this I will only request the Hon. Minister of State to reassure us that the interests of Tamils, all sections of Tamils, would be safeguarded for all time to come. And if

any in>i»edimenls are placed by (he SinbaL ese or by anybody else, or for that matter, by the Government of Sri Lanka, the Government of India will assure us that the interest of, Tamils w'H be safeguarded ;ind they will be protected, under all cir-cumstances.

With these words, I again congratulate the Government for thi$_s$ Agreement.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (SHRI JAGESH DESAl): The Minister will reply later.

The House adjourns till 11 a.m. on 18th August, 1987.

The House then adjourned at twenty-six minutes past six of the clock till eleven of the clock on Tuesday, the 18th August, 1987.

MGIPMRND—RS 1—918 RS—27—11—87